Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space

Guillaume Bernis () and Gaël Giraud
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Guillaume Bernis: Calyon, Capital Markets - GCE - Calyon, Capital Markets - GCE

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Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria.

Keywords: Mechanism design; constrained Walras equilibria; Banach lattice; non-ordered preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
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Published in Review of Economic Design, 2005, 9 (3), pp.271-287. ⟨10.1007/s10058-005-0130-1⟩

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Journal Article: Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00310499

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0130-1

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