Do domestic politics shape U.S. influence in the World Bank?

Erasmus Kersting () and Christopher Kilby

The Review of International Organizations, 2021, vol. 16, issue 1, No 2, 29-58

Abstract: Abstract Do U.S. presidential administrations exert more informal influence over international financial institutions when they face an uncooperative Congress and thus have less control over bilateral aid? Reexamining four empirical studies of the World Bank, we demonstrate that U.S. informal influence is driven by years with divided U.S. government. This provides a richer picture of when and why the U.S. exerts influence in multilateral settings and an alternate explanation to persistent questions about the role of international organizations in the international political economy.

Keywords: World Bank; Divided government; Geopolitics of aid; F35; F53; O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9321-8

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