Do domestic politics shape U.S. influence in the World Bank?
Erasmus Kersting () and
Christopher Kilby ()
No 28, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series from Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics
This paper investigates whether U.S. presidential administrations choose to exert more influence over international financial institutions when they have less control over bilateral aid because of a divided U.S. government. Reexamining four empirical studies of the World Bank, we demonstrate that findings of U.S. influence are driven by the years in which the U.S. government was divided. This provides a richer picture of when and why the U.S. exerts influence in multilateral settings and an alternate explanation to persistent questions about the role of international organizations in the international political economy.
Keywords: World Bank; Divided Government; Geopolitics of Aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 F53 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vil:papers:28
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series from Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher Kilby ().