Incentives for cooperation in groups: sociality meets decision rights

Britta Butz, Pablo Guillen and Christine Harbring ()
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Britta Butz: RWTH Aachen University
Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University

Review of Managerial Science, 2024, vol. 18, issue 10, No 5, 2925-2951

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of their donation. An up to 20% donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20% of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 and 20%. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. In groups voting in favor of a 20% donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment contributions to the public good are higher compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.

Keywords: Donations; Decision right; Public good game; Team incentives; Laboratory experiment; Charitable giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D64 D70 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11846-023-00698-x

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