EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Discrimination without taste: how discrimination can spillover and persist

Rajesh Ramachandran () and Christopher Rauh
Additional contact information
Rajesh Ramachandran: Heidelberg University

SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2018, vol. 9, issue 3, No 1, 249-274

Abstract: Abstract We introduce coordination failures driven by beliefs regarding the presence of taste discriminators as a channel of discrimination in productive activities requiring the input of multiple agents. We show that discrimination can persist under perfectly observable ability, when taste for discrimination has died out, and under absence of discriminatory social norms. Empirically we analyze the market for self-employment—an activity commonly requiring inputs from multiple agents. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, beliefs about discrimination are a significant correlate of self-employment rates, as well as the cost and success of establishing productive relations for blacks in the US.

Keywords: Discrimination; Coordination failure; Beliefs; Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13209-018-0179-z Abstract (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Discrimination without taste: How discrimination can spillover and persist (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Discrimination Without Taste - How Discrimination Can Spillover and Persist (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Discrimination Without Taste - How Discrimination can Spillover and Persist (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:series:v:9:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s13209-018-0179-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13209

DOI: 10.1007/s13209-018-0179-z

Access Statistics for this article

SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association is currently edited by Nezih Guner

More articles in SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association from Springer, Spanish Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-07
Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:9:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s13209-018-0179-z