Discrimination Without Taste - How Discrimination can Spillover and Persist

Rajesh Ramachandran and Christopher Rauh

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: We introduce coordination failures driven by beliefs regarding the presence of taste discriminators as a channel of discrimination in activities requiring the input of more than one individual for production to occur. We show discrimination can persist forever under perfectly observable ability, when taste for discrimination has died out, and under absence of discriminatory social norms. Empirically, we analyze the market for self-employment in the US, a market requiring input from multiple sources. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, we find beliefs about discrimination to be a significant negative correlate of self-employment rates of blacks in the US.

Keywords: Discrimination; Coordination Failure; Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pr~
Note: cr542
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Discrimination without taste: how discrimination can spillover and persist (2018)
Working Paper: Discrimination without taste: How discrimination can spillover and persist (2018)
Working Paper: Discrimination Without Taste - How Discrimination Can Spillover and Persist (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1466

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