Internes Benchmarking und relative Leistungsturniere

Matthias Kräkel

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 1998, vol. 50, issue 11, 1010-1028

Abstract: Summary We can argue that there is a considerable jog-trot problem when using internal benchmarking. This problem can be solved by complementary incentive systems. Rank-order tournaments constitute an incentive system that has ideal prerequisites in the case of internal benchmarking, but also conflicts with the main objective of internal benchmarking. Thus, alternative solutions are required. It is shown that the best solution consists of the exclusive use of rank-order tournaments to select successful routines in the sense of Nelson/Winter (1982). As a byproduct it is shown that rank-order tournaments do not suffer from a serious collusion problem, because such collusions are profitable but not stable in an equilibrium sense.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03371545

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