Auktionen als Instrument zur Erhebung von Zahlungsbereitschaften

Bernd Skiera and Inken Revenstorff
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Inken Revenstorff: Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 1999, vol. 51, issue 3, 224-242

Abstract: Summary In contrast to other approaches (e. g. conjoint analysis or contingent valuation), Vickrey-auctions have the nice property of providing an incentive compatible mechanism for the revelation of reservation prices. Despite this property, Vickrey-auctions are hardly used as an instrument to estimate reservation prices. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to illustrate the use and analyze the validity of Vickrey-auctions for the estimation of reservation prices. We present the design and examine the validity of the results of a study for the estimation of reservation prices for four different mobile cellular phone tariffs. Based on the encouraging results, we discuss limitations as well as further steps to improve the design of Vickrey-auctions and increase the widespread of Vickrey-auctions.

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03371564

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