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Besser abwickeln

Alexander Dilger ()

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2000, vol. 52, issue 7, 661-673

Abstract: Summary A problem of evaluation exists in winding up executory contracts in an insolvency. The trustee has difficulties in accurately considering the claim for damages that would arise when choosing to reject a contract instead of assuming it. Such a situation does not only impair the creditors but can lead to inefficient outcomes as well. However, by reforming the consequences of assuming an executory contract the problem can be solved. This is also desirable in order to achieve equal treatment. If an executory contract is assumed by the trustee, there should be the same claim for damages as if it had been rejected. Only the difference between this claim for damages and the initial claim should be paid directly out of the estate.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372633

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