Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments

Sanjay Srivastava and Michael A. Trick
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Sanjay Srivastava: Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
Michael A. Trick: Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, vol. 13, issue 3, 275-289

Abstract: A voting rule maps voter preferences into outcomes, and is called sophisticated if there exists a voting tree whose sophisticated outcomes coincide with the voting rule for every voter preference. As yet, no complete characterization of such rules is available. In this paper, we provide an important step toward this characterization by completely solving the problem when there are two possible sets of voter preferences.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: 2 November 1993/Accepted: 18 April 1995
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