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Partially efficient voting by committees

Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, vol. 13, issue 3, 327-342

Abstract: On the separable preference domain, voting by committees is the only class of voting rules that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity, and dictatorial rules are the only ones that are strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. To fill the gap, we define a sequence of efficiency conditions. We prove that for strategy-proof rules on the separable preference domain, the various notions of efficiency reduce to three: unanimity, partial efficiency, and Pareto efficiency. We also show that on the domain, strategy-proofness and partial efficiency characterize the class of voting rules represented as simple games which are independent of objects, proper and strong. We call such rules voting by stable committee.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: 24 December 1993/Accepted: 20 January 1995
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