Redistribution and compensation (*)

Marc Fleurbaey and Walter Bossert

Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, vol. 13, issue 3, 343-355

Abstract: In a model where individual incomes depend on the agents' characteristics, we provide characterizations of several redistribution mechanisms. These mechanisms are designed to eliminate the effects of characteristics that are to be considered "irrelevant", while preserving the influence of "relevant" characteristics on individual incomes. The mechanisms discussed here are egalitarian-equivalent and conditionally egalitarian mechanisms, as well as averaging versions of these rules.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: 9 June 1994/Accepted: 25 April 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:343-355

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Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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