Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments

Michel Le Breton and Guillaume Hollard
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Michel Le Breton: Greqam, UniversitÊd'Aix-Marseille 2, Institut Universitaire de France Chateau Lafarge, Route des Milles, 13290, Les Milles, France

Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, vol. 13, issue 4, 455 pages

Abstract: In this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: 3 March 1995/Accepted: 24 July 1995
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Working Paper: Logrolling and a McGarvey Theorem for Separable Tournaments (1995)
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