Voting power when using preference ballots

Duncan J. Melville and Deanna B. Haunsperger
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Duncan J. Melville: Department of Mathematics, St. Lawrence University, Canton, NY 13617, USA
Deanna B. Haunsperger: Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, vol. 13, issue 4, 457-465

Abstract: In this paper we provide a generalized power index which gives a measurement of voting power in multi-candidate elections with weighted voting using preference ballots. We use the power index to compare the power of various players between an election using plurality and one using the Borda method. The power index is based upon the Banzhaf power index.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: 2 March 1995/Accepted: 7 September 1995
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