Informational geometry of social choice

Donald G. Saari
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Donald G. Saari: Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208-2730, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 14, issue 2, 232 pages

Abstract: Elementary geometry is used to understand, extend and resolve basic informational difficulties in choice theory. This includes axiomatic conclusions such as Arrow's Theorem, Chichilnisky's dictator, and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result. In this manner new results about positional voting methods are outlined, and difficulties with axiomatic approach are discussed. A topological result about "dictatorial" behavior is offered.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: 15 December 1993/Accepted: 22 April 1996
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