Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps (*)

Heine Rasmussen
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Heine Rasmussen: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, N-5035 Bergen-Sandviken, Norway

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 14, issue 2, 249-257

Abstract: We consider continuous aggregation maps (e.g., social welfare functions). By assuming that the voters have preferences over social outcomes, we regard the social decision procedure as a noncooperative game, with the aggregation map as a game form. The map is called strategy-proof if it is a Nash equilibrium that the voters report their most preferred outcomes. We give sufficient topological conditions on the space of outcomes so that only dictatorial maps are strategy-proof.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: 28 February 1994/Accepted: April 22, 1996
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