Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

Gleb Koshevoy
Additional contact information
Gleb Koshevoy: Russian Academy of Sciences, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute Krasikova 32, Moscow 117418, Russia

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 14, issue 2, 295-302

Abstract: We establish that the Pareto property is inconsistent with non-dictatorship for social choice rules defined on two-dimensional choice spaces. In addition, we consider applications of this result in higher dimensions. We also establish the existence of Pareto rules with infinite populations, and show that in this case there is a strong manipulator.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/7014002/70140295.pdf (application/pdf)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/0035 ... 14002/70140295.ps.gz (application/postscript)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:2:p:295-302

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().