Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results
Graciela Chichilnisky and
Geoffrey Heal
Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 14, issue 2, 303-318
Abstract:
We provide a simple construction of social choice rules for economies with infinite populations. The rules are continuous, Pareto and non-dictatorial; they are constructed as limits of individual preferences when the limit exists, and otherwise as adequate generalizations. This contrasts with the impossibility results of Arrow (1951) and Chichilnisky (1980), which are valid on economies with finitely many individuals. Our social choice rules are, however, limits of dictatorial rules. This paper was written in 1979.
Date: 1997
Note: Received: 30 October 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996
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Working Paper: Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results (1995)
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