Equitable agendas: agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions

K. B. Reid
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K. B. Reid: Department of Mathematics, California State University, San Marcos, San Marcos, CA 92096-0001, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 14, issue 3, 363-377

Abstract: Sophisticated voting under amendment procedure using majority rule usually results in a decision that is distinct from the decision obtained through sincere voting. In this article it is shown that the underlying majority tournament (determined by the voters' preferences) admits an agenda so that the sincere and sophisticated decisions are identical if and only if the initial strong component of the tournament is not a 3-cycle. As a result, most tournaments, in an asymptotic sense, admit an agenda so that the sincere and sophisticated decisions are identical.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: 31 August 1993/Accepted: 28 August 1995
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