Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

Sang-Chul Suh

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 14, issue 3, 439-447

Abstract: We deal with the implementation problem where agents in some groups can cooperate (or form coalitions) and in some others cannot. We consider a situation where the planner does not know whether agents in a group can cooperate or not. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a correspondence to be implementable in such a situation.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: 28 February 1995/Accepted: 13 March 1996
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