Hansson's theorem for generalized social welfare functions: an extension

John Duggan

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 14, issue 4, 478 pages

Abstract: Hansson (1969) sets forth four conditions satisfied by no generalized social welfare function (GSWF), a mapping from profiles of individual preferences to arbitrary social preference relations. Though transitivity is not imposed on social preferences, one of Hansson's conditions requires that socially maximal alternatives always exist. Of course, this condition is not satisfied by the majority GSWF. We prove a generalization of Hansson's theorem that requires the existence of maximal alternatives only in very special cases. Our result applies to the majority GSWF and a large class of other GSWFs that sometimes produce no maximal alternatives.

Date: 1997-09-30
Note: Received: 10 July 1995/Accepted: 4 March 1996
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