Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
Dimitrios Diamantaras and
Robert P. Gilles
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Robert P. Gilles: Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA
Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 15, issue 1, 139 pages
Abstract:
We consider an economy with non-Samuelsonian public goods and we focus on linear cost sharing. In a linear cost sharing equilibrium all agents in the economy optimize given a certain fixed cost share to be contributed towards the provision of public goods in the economy. Hence, each agent pays a certain fraction of the total establishment costs of public goods and these cost shares are common knowledge. We show that for a certain fixed contribution scheme the resulting linear cost share equilibria are equivalent to corresponding core allocations, in which the core is based on the integral of the individual cost shares. We also show that there is no equivalence of the Foley core with cost share equilibria, even in well-behaved large economies.
Date: 1997-11-13
Note: Received: 16 August 1995/Accepted: 29 July 1996
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