An extension of Bowen's dynamic voting rule to many dimensions

Pierre de Trenqualye
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Pierre de Trenqualye: Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York YO1 5DD, England

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 15, issue 1, 159 pages

Abstract: We ask in this paper about the effect on social decisions of limiting the size of changes that voters may propose each time in an otherwise standard dynamic social choice model. The voting rule we study can be seen as an extension of Bowen's dynamic "majority voting" rule, and is closely related to the dynamic procedures for public good allocation in the literature (DrÉze and de la VallÊe Poussin 1971; Malinvaud 1971; Laffont and Maskin 1983; Chander 1993). Under general assumptions we prove existence and Pareto efficiency of equilibrium, and show that our rule motivates voters not to misrepresent preferences (more precisely, the rule is Strongly Locally Individually Incentive Compatible). Under Euclidean preferences we find that electoral cycles do not arise (i.e., the rule is convergent), that there is a unique equilibrium, and that the equilibrium coincides with the solution to an old problem of geometry, first addressed by Fermat, Torricelli, and Cavallieri.

Date: 1997-11-13
Note: Received: 20 September 1994/Accepted: 6 August 1996
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