Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights

Bezalel Peleg

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, vol. 15, issue 1, 67-80

Abstract: In this paper we offer an axiomatic approach for the investigation of rights by means of game forms. We give a new definition of constitution which consists of three components: the set of rights, the assignment of rights to groups of members of the society, and the distribution of power in the society (as a function of the distribution of rights). Using the foregoing definition we investigate game forms that faithfully represent the distribution of power in the society, and allow the members of the society to exercise their rights simultaneously. Several well-known examples are analyzed in the light of our framework. Finally, we find a connection between Sen's minimal liberalism and Maskin's result on implementation by Nash equilibria.

Date: 1997-11-13
Note: Received: 25 November 1994/Accepted: 28 June 1996
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