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Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules

Susan H. Gensemer, Lu Hong and Jerry S. Kelly
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Susan H. Gensemer: Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA
Lu Hong: Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA
Jerry S. Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 2, 209 pages

Abstract: We examine the extent to which migration equilibria fail to exist in a global economy in which a specific division rule determines the allocation of a perfectly divisible, nondisposable resource among individuals with single-peaked preferences who reside in local economies. In particular, almost without exception, under the egalitarian, proportional, queuing, and uniform division rules, migration equilibria fail to exist for some sets of preferences.

Date: 1998-02-27
Note: Received: 23 May 1995 / Accepted: 1 October 1996
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