Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments

Bettina Klaus (), Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
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Ton Storcken: Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 2, 297-311

Abstract: We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, reversibility, and an equal-treatment condition. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his individual endowment.

Date: 1998-02-27
Note: Received: 8 September 1995/Accepted: 30 October 1996
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