An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem

Edi Karni and John Weymark

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 3, 332 pages

Abstract: In Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem, an impartial observer determines a social ordering of the lotteries on the set of social alternatives based on a sympathetic but impartial concern for all individuals in society. This ordering is derived from a more primitive ordering on the set of all extended lotteries. An extended lottery is a lottery which determines both the observer's personal identity and the social alternative. We establish a version of Harsanyi's theorem in which the observer is only required to have preferences on the extended lotteries in which there is an equal chance of being any person in society.

Date: 1998-06-02
Note: Received: 19 June 1996 / Accepted: 30 December 1996
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