Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

Marco Mariotti

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 3, 413-421

Abstract: Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.

Date: 1998-06-02
Note: Received: 12 July 1996 / Accepted: 6 February 1997
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