Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

Peter Fristrup and Hans Keiding
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Hans Keiding: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 3, 455-467

Abstract: This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function.

Date: 1998-06-02
Note: Received: 30 November 1993 / Accepted: 14 April 1997
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