Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
Yves Sprumont ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 4, 543-558
Abstract:
We reconsider the problem of provision and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. The efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible. We show that this rule is characterized in economies with a continuum of agents by efficiency, a natural upper bound on everyone's welfare, and a property of solidarity with respect to changes in population and preferences.
Date: 1998-08-06
Note: Received: 3 August 1995 / Accepted : 29 April 1997
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Working Paper: Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods (1996) 
Working Paper: Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods (1996)
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