Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem

Vincenzo Denicolo' ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 4, 563-566

Abstract: I show that the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Arrow's impossibility theorem can be weakened into Relational Independent Decisiveness. The condition of Relational Independent Decisiveness is essentially a translation of Sen's Independent Decisiveness into the traditional Arrovian framework. I also show by example that Relational Independent Decisiveness is indeed weaker than Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.

Date: 1998-08-06
Note: Received: 30 October 1996 / Accepted: 22 May 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/8015004/80150563.pdf (application/pdf)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/0035 ... 15004/80150563.ps.gz (application/postscript)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:563-566

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().