Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle

Jerry S. Kelly and Donald E. Campbell ()
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Jerry S. Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA
Donald E. Campbell: Department of Economics and the Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 4, 583-592

Abstract: For social choice rules that can select either one or two alternatives, strategy-proofness is incompatible with a weak Condorcet principle.

Date: 1998-08-06
Note: Received: 8 July 1996 / Accepted: 9 June 1997
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