Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good

Shinji Ohseto
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Shinji Ohseto: Department of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, 56-1, Tojiin-Kitamachi, Kita, Kyoto 603, Japan

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 1, 136 pages

Abstract: We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. There are three types of mechanisms which have the following properties: (i) they determine the allocation of monetary compensation depending on who receives the indivisible good; (ii) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the pre-specified (one or two) agent(s); and (iii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified agent(s). This result implies that the presence of an indivisible good induces serious asymmetry in mechanisms.

Date: 1998-11-16
Note: Received: 26 March 1996 / Accepted: 23 September 1997
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