An extension of a theorem on the aggregation of separable preferences

Laurent Vidu

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 1, 159-167

Abstract: An Excess-Voting Function relative to a profile assigns to each pair of alternatives (x,y), the number of voters who prefer x to y minus the number of voters who prefer y to x. It is shown that any non-binary separable Excess-Voting Function can be achieved from a preferences profile when individuals are endowed with separable preferences. This result is an extension of Hollard and Le Breton (1996).

Date: 1998-11-16
Note: Received: 16 December 1996 / Accepted: 8 October 1997
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