The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings

Adrian Van Deemen ()
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Adrian Van Deemen: University of Nijmegen, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 2, 182 pages

Abstract: In this paper the probability of the voting paradox for weak orderings is calculated analytically for the three-voter-three-alternative case. It appears that the probability obtained this way is considerably smaller than in the corresponding case for linear orderings. The probability of intransitive majority relations for weak orderings in the 3 þ 3 case is calculated as well, both with unconcerned and with concerned voters. Basic in the calculations are three theorems which are formulated in the field of domain conditions and restricted preferences.

Date: 1999-01-28
Note: Received: 18 February 1997 / Accepted: 21 October 1997
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