Choice rules with fuzzy preferences: Some characterizations

Kunal Sengupta ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 2, 259-272

Abstract: Consider an agent with fuzzy preferences. This agent, however, has to make exact choices when faced with different feasible sets of alternatives. What rule does he follow in making such choices? This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a class of binary choice rules called the satisfying rule. When =1, this rule is the Orlovsky choice rule. On the other hand, for \leq1/2, the rule coincides with the M rule that has been extensively analyzed in the literature on fuzzy preferences.

Date: 1999-01-28
Note: Received: 3 August 1995/Accepted: 19 November 1997
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