On the separability of assembly preferences

Jean-Pierre BenoÏt () and Lewis A. Kornhauser ()
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Jean-Pierre BenoÏt: School of Law, New York University, 40 Washington Square South, Room 314E, New York, NY 10012, USA
Lewis A. Kornhauser: School of Law, New York University, 40 Washington Square South, Room 314E, New York, NY 10012, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 3, 429-439

Abstract: Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. This candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over assemblies are separable. We show, however, that if preferences over assemblies are themselves derived from underlying preferences over legislative or economic outcomes, then preferences over assemblies will not in general be separable.

Date: 1999-05-11
Note: Received: 23 June 1997/Accepted: 3 March 1998
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