No-envy and Arrow's conditions

Vincenzo Denicolo' ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 4, 585-597

Abstract: This paper analyzes the concept of envy-freeness in the framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We define various no-envy conditions and study their relationships with Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. We also propose a new condition, called Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the conditional power to veto at least one social state (for instance, a social state which is particularly unfair to him). We show that, under unrestricted domain, Pareto Optimality and a weak independence condition, Minimal Equity leads to an impossibility result.

Date: 1999-08-31
Note: Received: 9 October 1997/Accepted: 27 May 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/9016004/90160585.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:585-597

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().