Manipulability measures of common social choice functions

David A. Smith
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David A. Smith: 1750 Mission Street #43, San Francisco, CA 94103, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 4, 639-661

Abstract: All social choice functions are manipulable when more than two alternatives are available. I evaluate the manipulability of the Borda count, plurality rule, minimax set, and uncovered set. Four measures of manipulability are defined and computed stochastically for small numbers of agents and alternatives. Social choice rules derived from the minimax and uncovered sets are found to be relatively immune to manipulation whether a sole manipulating agent has complete knowledge or absolutely no knowledge of the preferences of the others. The Borda rule is especially manipulable if the manipulating agent has complete knowledge of the others.

Date: 1999-08-31
Note: Received: 5 January 1996/Accepted: 31 July 1998
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