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Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model

David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks
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David Austen-Smith: Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 4, 663-672

Abstract: McKelvey [4] proved that for strong simple preference aggregation rules applied to multidimensional sets of alternatives, the typical situation is that either the core is nonempty or the top-cycle set includes all available alternatives. But the requirement that the rule be strong excludes, inter alia, all supermajority rules. In this note, we show that McKelvey's theorem further implies that the typical situation for any simple rule is that either the core is nonempty or the weak top-cycle set (equivalently, the core of the transitive closure of the rule) includes all available alternatives. Moreover, it is often the case that both of these statements obtain.

Date: 1999-08-31
Note: Received: 13 October 1997/Accepted: 24 August 1998
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Working Paper: Cycling of Simple Rules in the Spatial Model (1998) Downloads
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