Representatives and districts

Brendan O'Flaherty ()
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Brendan O'Flaherty: Department of Economics, Columbia University, Mail Code 3308, New York, NY 10027, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 1, 157-178

Abstract: Why would any group want to have a decision-making body composed of representatives? The best answer is found in the "Anti-Federalist ideal" identified by Wood [1992]: if within-group benefits are highly correlated, a legislature composed of randomly chosen representatives that maximized its own well-being would maximize the well-being of the entire polity. This argument for representative government implies that the best districting schemes are the most segregated: within-district variance is minimized.

Date: 1999-11-15
Note: Received: 9 June 1997/Accepted 28 December 1998
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