Information and preference aggregation

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 1, 3-24

Abstract: We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice.

Date: 1999-11-15
Note: Received: 20 August 1997/Accepted: 29 September 1998
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