Collusion, renegotiation and implementation

Sandeep Baliga () and Sandro Brusco

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 1, 69-83

Abstract: We study the implementation problem for exchange economies when agents can renegotiate the outcome assigned by the planner and can collude. We focus on the use of sequential mechanisms and present a simple sufficient condition for implementation with renegotiation in strong perfect equilibrium. We present an application to optimal risk sharing, showing that the possibility of collusion and renegotiation does not in general prevent the implementation of efficient allocations.

Date: 1999-11-15
Note: Received: 27 August 1997/Accepted: 29 October 1998
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