Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized

John Duggan and Thomas Schwartz

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 1, 85-93

Abstract: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.

Date: 1999-11-15
Note: Received: 15 December 1997/Accepted: 16 November 1998
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