A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem

Ruth Ben-Yashar () and Jacob Paroush ()
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Ruth Ben-Yashar: Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel 52900
Jacob Paroush: Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel 52900

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 2, 189-199

Abstract: This paper provides first the condition under which the majority of an odd number of jurists is more likely to choose the better of two alternatives than a single jurist selected at random from the jurists, given that each jurist has a probability larger than one half of choosing correctly, and second that the same inequality holds for a subset of an odd number of jurists chosen at random from the original group.

Date: 2000-02-28
Note: Received: 16 November 1998/Accepted: 8 January 1999
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