Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions

Antonio Quesada

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 3, 506 pages

Abstract: A merging (or assessment aggregation) function (see [7]) is a rule that synthesizes several individual assessments, or numerical judgements, by creating a unique "collective" assessment. Individual i can manipulate assessment aggregation if the change in the merged assessment due to a change in i's assessment from x to y depends solely on x and y. Some assumptions on the functional form capturing this dependence are put forward and their effects on aggregation investigated under unanimity and anonymity conditions using a functional equation approach. Attention is restricted to three types of results: the merging function does not exist; it is the arithmetic mean; it is dictatorial.

Date: 2000-05-02
Note: Received: 21 November 1997/Accepted: 31 May 1999
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