A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set

Mathieu Martin

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 3, 559-565

Abstract: Peleg (1978) presents a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core, by considering quota games. The purpose of this paper is to present a similar result for the non-emptiness of another solution concept introduced by Rubinstein (1980) and called the stability set.

Date: 2000-05-02
Note: Received: 25 January 1999/Accepted: 6 July 1999
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