A note on monotonicity in iterated choice functions

Sylvain J. Durand ()
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Sylvain J. Durand: êquipe ThÊorie de la DÊcision, Laboratoire LEIBNIZ, Institut IMAG, 46, avenue FÊlix Viallet, F-38031 Grenoble Cedex France

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 1, 129-134

Abstract: This short paper proves the following conjecture of D. Bouyssou: a preference aggregation function built by iteration of a strictly monotonic and symmetric social choice correspondence cannot be strictly monotonic.

Date: 2001-01-10
Note: Received: 1 October 1998/Accepted: 23 December 1999
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