A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule

Thomas C. Ratliff ()
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Thomas C. Ratliff: Department of Mathematics, Wheaton College, Norton, MA 02766-0930, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 1, 79-89

Abstract: In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's method is designed to find the candidate that is "closest" to being a Condorcet winner. Similarly, if the head-to-head elections among all candidates do not give a complete transitive ranking, then Kemeny's Rule finds the "closest" transitive ranking. This paper uses geometric techniques to compare Dodgson's and Kemeny's notions of closeness and explain how conflict can arise between the two methods.

Date: 2001-01-10
Note: Received: 19 October 1999/Accepted: 6 December 1999
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