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A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action

Arieh Gavious () and Shlomo Mizrahi ()
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Shlomo Mizrahi: School of Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 1, 105 pages

Abstract: The paper offers a complex and systematic model of the bandwagon effect in collective action using continuous time equations. The model treats the bandwagon effect as a process influenced by ratio between the mobilization efforts of social activists and the resources invested by the government to counteract this activity. The complex modeling approach makes it possible to identify the conditions for specific types of the bandwagon effect, and determines the scope of that effect. Relying on certain behavioral assumptions, these conditions are only indirectly connected to individual beliefs, so that a given bandwagon effect can be explained and planned without knowing the exact preferences of the players' preferences.

Date: 2001-01-10
Note: Received: 25 February 1999/Accepted: 30 November 1999
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